The Bombing of Japan: post I
Herken, Gregg. The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War 1945-1950. New York: Random House, 1981. Pp. 425.
Divided into three parts The Winning Weapon, by Gregg Herken, evaluates the build up and deployment of the atomic bombs in Japan. Herken first discusses atomic diplomacy and capabilities, proclaiming America’s rejection of open discussions with Russia regarding the bomb was embracing a policy of monopoly. Herken also addresses President Truman’s initial response to issues after Hiroshima, declaring he was not decisive, but hesitant and vacillating (6). Herken’s third focus in The Winning Weapon is an evaluation of American strategic thinking. It was America’s hope to maintain a monopoly on atomic power. Herken details the attempted secrecy and fears American scientists combated. It did not take long for Russia to remove American exclusivity threatening the security of American society. Confidence waned in the Truman administration as it was discovered that despite atomic production, American security was not adequate to defend against international atomic capabilities. Reliance upon America’s nuclear monopoly instilled a false sense of security. The discovery of Soviet knowledge sparked communist fear in American society. In Herken’s opinion the epidemic fear of soviet espionage was more detrimental than any presence of true espionage could have been.
Schaffer, Ronald. Wings of Judgement: America bombing in 1985. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. Pp. 272.
Ronald Schaffer evaluates the evolution of American air strategy including detailed descriptions and concerns of the bombing of Germany, fire raids in Japan, and the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In his analysis he includes the changing moral attitude of civilians and military personnel, as well as perceptions of and reactions to the moral issue of bombing. He begins with a proposition that American generals exercised moral concerns when making decisions for military involvement. However, Schaffer highlights the subjective nature of decision making as there were discrepancies in the definition of military necessity. Generally accepted was the notion to protect civilians from military operation. However, in the realm of military necessity it was not always possible.
Alperovitz, Gar. The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995. Pp. 843.
Presenting arguments of conspiracy and dissent Gar Alperovitz evaluates the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki declaring such extreme action to be out of the realm of necessity, arguing the possibilities of Japanese surrender were apparent. Alperovitz includes considerable information from White House correspondence and other documents, while also raising concerns about information unavailable due to apparent attempts to withhold revelations from the public and other documents that showed signs of manipulation. The work is divided into two books and eleven parts. Book I focuses on top government officials and their activities prior to dropping bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Book II begins with an examination of both Henry L. Stimson, President Harry Truman, and James Byrnes, continuing with an exploration of American belief and how the myth of necessity developed and was perpetuated.
December 03 2005 09:10 pm | History and Ramblings
