Vietnam
Why did the US intervene directly in the Vietnam War in 1965?
Stemming from the growth of Cold War fears and an attitude of liberation America’s involvement in Vietnam is one of the most traumatic events in American history. Defeating the French on July 21, 1954, Vietnam was temporarily divided by the Geneva Accords. The United States then became the dominant western influence, hoping to create a sustaining anti-communist government. In the eyes of United States officials, the advancement of communism in Vietnam would be an American defeat despite our level of involvement. Without intervention it was determined by officials, such as W.Walton Butterworth, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and Raymond B. Fosdick, consultant to the State Department on Far Eastern Affairs, that there was limited chance of Vietnam falling to communism.
Cold War fears were founded in the domino theory, explained by President Eisenhower in a 1954 interview with Copley Press. Explaining the importance of Indochina Eisenhower explains the material value of the area stating the importance of tin, tungsten, and the rubber plantations to world trade. Eisenhower also expressed concern for humans suffering under the control of a communist dictator. According to Eisenhower’s statements, there were not only economic disadvantages to non-intervention, but the question of freedom for millions. Eisenhower explained broader considerations, describing the domino theory. Vietnam held geographic importance, explaining that if communism took hold it would threaten nearby Japan, the Philippines, even Australia and New Zealand. The premise was that if Vietnam fell to communism surrounding countries would have to turn to communist trading partners, facing the possibility and likelihood of communist influence. In Eisenhower’s opinion, losing Vietnam to communism could have a domino effect with incalculable damage to the free world (286-287).
Many joined the Vietcong did so out of desperation. Propaganda of the Vietcong helped organize the poor to rise against landlords in hopes they would gain freedom and strength to overthrow their economic oppressors. The poor joined the movement in hopes of gaining freedom and prosperity for their country. In the view of anticommunist such as the United States the poor were trading one oppressor for another.
The United States chose to assist South Vietnam, helping them secure their freedom and stability. In response to repeated naval attacks against the United States and Vietcong aggression directed at Stouh Vietnam, the United States Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964 granting the President permission to take necessary measures to secure American security in the region and prevent continued aggression. The resolution went on to state the vital importance of southeast Asia to national interest and international peace (290).
Three courses of action were discussed concerning the expansion of war in Vietnam. The first was to cut losses and withdraw, arranging the best conditions possible. The second was to continue the current plan, realizing limitations and the probability of weakening United States military pressure. The third option involved substantial expansion of the war effort and a vigorous campaign of negotiation (291). The third option involved military and political actions to secure success. Hopes were to open a dialogue of negotiation between North and South Vietnam and to resist increasing Soviet influence in North Vietnam. There were limited expectations of success as the United States military force was not sufficient to fight a guerrilla war in the area. Military success was dependent on significant improvements in recognizing, locating, and defeating the enemy, a more conventional conduction of war. Political analysis was also not positive as increased involvement of the United States military would be unpopular both at home and in Vietnam. Overall, there was limited expectation that the communist North would alter strategy or lose influence without significant defeat. Prospects of success in Vietnam were bleak, according to a report by Robert S. McNamara, June 26, 1965.
The United States chose selective involvement in Vietnam hoping to influence change and prosperity in one region, South Vietnam, and gaining similar influence in North Vietnam. Fear of communist intervention was a driving force for the United States, with prevailing thought centering on the belief in the limited self-governing capacity of Southeast Asians, and increased likelihood of communist influence. The United States declared a parenting role over such areas hoping to guide them to national maturity and independence. In essence the United States sought to exert influence over Vietnam by direct intervention, believing such action would achieve development of a political environment consistent with American interest.
In “The Meaning of Vietnam”, George C. Herring states, “The Americans could provide money and weapons, but they could not furnish the ingredients necessary for political stability, and military success (311).” The United States did not expect the South Vietnamese to be able to rise against the communist influence of North Vietnam. Fearing communist expansion the United States chose direct intervention. Herring indicates the fallacy of the domino theory, explaining the growth, stability, and prosperity of many non-communist countries in Southeast Asia.
Direct intervention led to resentment and distrust of the federal government also threatening the international reputation of the United States. The legacies of direct intervention in Vietnam war are trauma, fear, and frustration. Cold war fears of communist expansion and the “domino theory” proved unfounded as the United States cried wolf and got bitten. Such actions have resulted in the continued questioning of American strategy abroad and fears of repeating the Vietnam experience.
December 07 2005 11:21 am | History and Ramblings
